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The chief object of the American...occupation...(is to)...
bestow the immunities and blessing of our enlightenment
and liberal institutions and government.
— proclamation Issued by General
Miles on the capitulation of Ponce
on July 28, 1898.
Associated statehood for a quarter of a century had made
Puerto Rico different in degree but not in kind from the
neighboring states of the Caribbean and circum-Caribbean-
with the notable exception of Cuba.
~ Frank W. Knight, The Caribbean:
The Genesis of a Fragmented
Nationalism, 1978, p. 16^~
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SUMMARY & PURPOSE
f
^ The basic argument of this paper is that the Puerto Ric'an experience
of economic development, both quantitatively and qualitatively, is relevant
for the rest of the Caribbean and, indeed, for the rest of the developing
world. This argument is made in contradiction to the general view that
by its very-success, Puerto Rico represents the exemplary case which is
"too special", particularly in terms of its relationship with the U.S.
Among the so-called developing countries,.there is something similar
about the class of small, open, densely-populated countries. The similari
ties and differences between these small nations — such factors as market
size, resource base, their reliance on foreign capital, their colonial
experience, lack of political power — may be open to dispute. But our
• starting point is simply that there are lessons from the development experi
ence of a class of country which has grown on the fringe of major' itidustrial
powers.
Within this class of small, open countries, the economies of the Carib
bean have had similar experiences, and it is in this context that the Caribbean
"pattern" takes on" new meaning. The "economic unity" of ,the Caribbean is
examined therefore in "cross sections" of the Caribbean which highlight
the range and heterogeneity of their different economic structures. A second
approach, the examination of "time series,," is based on the notion not that
country A passes through a similar trajectory as country B, but simply.that
there are diferent possible routes. A series of moving pictures, based on
the past, may provide indications of possible paths to the future — or of
paths to be avoided.
Within the Caribbean, Puerto Rico is exceptional, not, as many have
claimed, for its spectacular economic growth or its unique political status.
Its growth, diversification of exports, reliance on tourism, out-migration,
. currency stability, as well as its commonwealth status, all bear simirarities
to other colonial territories, all of-which have their own unique, negotiated
agreements with different industrial powers. Puerto Rico is exceptional only
; in the quantitative sense of having pushed a particular development "strategy"
to the extreme. This strategy has been guided, I argue, by pragmatic elements
in both the U.S. and Puerto Rico, and has been analyzed in terms of the "labor-
surplus" model which has since been applied to many other, developing situations.
The great success of Puerto Rico shows the limits., not of the special
case, but of the general case, since that Island has traveled the farthest
in the shortest time on this particular path. The net result of the forces
^ which have pushed from within and have led from without are not dissimilar
^ f,rqm those forces acting on the entire class of small, open,, densely-populated
countries.
The experience of Puerto Rico is relevant to Latin America in particular.
Yet the application of the "structuralist model," so very important in
analyzing the shortcomings of the Import substitution strategy, has evoked
little response from Latin American scholars in its application to Caribbean
problems. A strange unity is now being seen betwean an inwardly-oriented
import-substitution strategy, on the one hand, and an outwardly-oriented,
export-promotion strategy ("Industrialization by invitation"), on the other,
a unity perhaps consummated in the transnational corporation. Thus, the
economic arrangement which Puerto Rico "enjoys" with the United States is
actively sought in part by many other Latin American, some African, and the
lesser-developed nations of Europe with respect to a whole variety of policies
in which Puerto Rico had Initially "pioneered": branch plants, tax holidays,
migrant labor, to name a few policies; Mexico, Turkey, Spain, Portugal,
Algeria, Tunisia, Ireland to name but a few countries.
Finally, I argue that the viable alternative "models" which may prove
useful for correctly analyzing development remain yet to be created: that
is not the task of this paper. Such models must be built on observing
reality, not in imagining it. The present paper is but a preface to an
analysis of that type2of model which grows out of an empirical study of the
Puerto Rican economy.
The reverse cannot be said about Caribbean economists. See Girvan
(1971).
2
Colonial Industrialization in the Caribbean: The Economic 'Development'
of Puerto Rico (1978).
Puerto Rico & The Caribbean Economies:
Models & Patterns
by
Richard Weisskoff
INTRODUCTION
It is the fashion among economists who claim to be concerned with the
developing countries to ignore and discount the experience of Puerto Rico
as a "model" or "case" worthy of study or emulation. Having praised Puerto
Rico s progress widely in the 1950's and early 1960*3,, economists today turn
elsewhere .for their "model countries," Its rapid and long-term growth is
wished away as a thoroughly typical case, the."super" (and thereby"inimitable)
success by the very criteria which once held Puerto Rico as the exemplary
or prototypical case. To othiers, Puerto Rico represents tlie worst in a
certain "style" of development, and by becoming just another subregion with
the U.S., Puerto Rico has lost its relevance as a national economy.
The truth, however, is quite the opposite. Despite the fall from grace
t
as a worthy academic model, many elements stemming from the Puerto Rican
experience operate in a real way throughout the rest of the Caribbean. The
^business community, having learned from the Puerto Rican environment, has
come to expect ^d has, received — similar treatment by other islands.
While the nationalist movements in the Caribbean see Puerto Rico as the model
of the evils of development and extreme neo-colonialism, many of the elements
» '
especially Reynolds (1965), but the literature goes back to Galbraith
(i963^ (1955), Baer (1959), Jaffe (1959). Haring a961)', and Pico
Important in the Puerto Rican program are already operational in their
countries: tax-holidays, industrial promotionj tourism, enclave industries.
.Not only does Puerto Rico represent the extreme case of the "labor-surplus"
model for the rest of the Caribbean, but the most perceptive critique of the
Puerto Rican path comes not from within Puerto Rico or from the United
States, but from other Caribbean observers.
Because Puerto Rico has traveled the farthest in the shortest time
along a particular development path, the island's experience demonstrates the
limits, not of the special case, but of the general one for a wide range of
developing economies. Because the failings of the Puerto Rican path are
glaring and well-known (they range from high unemployment to human rights
violations), it may be important within the development "establishment" to
minimize the Puerto Rican experience and look elsewhere for less extreme and
less prominent examples. As the original case of the "labor-surplus"
economy, the experience of Puerto Rico demonstrates the bankruptcy of the
very model that has become the "standard operating" paradigm for viewing
development problems in the West.
PART A: ON THE BIPORTANCE OF THE PUERTO RICAN MODEL
The general argument for dismissing the Puerto Rican case within the
U.S. is advanced in terms of its "intimate" relationship with the U.S.
Puerto Rico is "not a model for Caribbean small-state development," summa
rizes Ben Stephansky, an authority on Puerto Rico.
2. Other writers have demonstrated similar reservations. See Ingram
(1962) and (1969), Reynolds and Gregory (1965). Gordon Lewis (1963) has
always his own Iceen perspective on the Caribbean.
A
Tlie reason is that the vital source of Puerto Rico's development
is its unique politico-institutional relationship to the U.S.
Tliis relationship... [a customs untion, a conimon currency, ample
. budget for public expenditures, fiscal autonomy and flexibility,
-access to-capital markets, a secure legal framework]..;Is not
transferable.
Yet Stephansky does admit that Puerto Rico*s presence has changed the
situation by its "accomplishments":
The demonstration that the "Caribbean species of the small state,
beset by the characteristic constraint of small size, limited
resources, monoculture, overpopulation, and low level of human
achievement, was capable of development and not doomed to eternal .
backwardness constitutes a psychological breakthrough for the
whole region... "
But "psychological breakthroughs" and "demonstration effects" work
both ways: first, by other Caribbean governments and politicians searching
for material improvement within their own setting, anxious to imitate their
neighbor's "success" at-riding the economic tiger (while avoiding its fate);
and second, by transnational enterprises anxious to avail themselves of other
iow' wage, profitable island-opportunities, and who (like the tourist) have
discovered the value of island-hopping.
Nor is the "vital source" for Puerto Rico's growth the politico-institu
tional relationship to the U.S. A general style of development and the
concrete programs are duplicated under a variety of "politico-institutional"
3
See his essay, "Puerto Rico", p. 93, in T. Szulc, editor; (1971).
Ironically," McDonald's chapter, "The Commonwealth Caribbean," tells'^ us more
about" Puerto Rico, while Kalman Silvert's concluisions, "The Caribbean and
North America," igriore their fundamental differences.
^Ibid., p. 93. , " '
arrangGniGnts. Simply by its being and being successful, Puerto Rico offers
itself as a model for Caribbean development,^
But Puerto Rico had not always been regarded so equivocally*
W. Arthur Lewis, himself the author of what was to become known as "the labor-
(
surplus model," had seen Puerto Rico's "export promotion" campaign as the
strategy for the small, densely-populated, islands. He wrote:'
...What should be done, is to try to persuade existing suppl.iers
with established channels in Latin America, to open factories
in'the islands to supply their trade...It is what Puerto Rico
is doing, in its invasion of the U.S. market, and it is oge of
the outstanding lessons of the Puerto Rican experience...
Lewis' enthusiasm continues:
There is no reason why the West Indies should not succeed in.
getting the very small share of these markets which is all that
is needed to put the^islands on their feet. Puerto Rico shows
that it can be done.
Although her wage level is much higher than that of the British
island, she is exporting a wide range of manufactures to the
' U.S. Wliat Puerto Rico and the countrigs of Europe...can do,"
the British West Indies can do also...
Stephansky's conclusion that "both Puerto Rico and the Caribbean region
could pursue their own paths of development without each other..." is true
only insofar as no locus of power actually connects the Caribbean, save those
which pass through the central grids of those external agencies and govern
ments whose interests are affected by them. Ibid., p. 9^. Stephansky was
executive secretary of the U.S.P.R. Commission on the Status of Puerto Rico.
See U.S. Congress (1966).
^Lewis (1951), p. 30. Emphasis added. The modern reader cannot help
but comment on the two-way nature of the "invasion."
^Ibid., Pi' 33. Emphasis added.
®Ibid., p. 35.
Lewis saw a key in clusters of Industries, in industries that "hung
together" and used one another's products. "Industries are like sheep, he
g
wrote. "They like to move together." And, changing metaphors, "for once
the snowball starts to move downhill, it will move of its own momentum and
will get bigger and bigger as it moves along.
Lewis preferred foreign capital in manufacturing rather than in the
extractive sectors, and praised the tripartite wage-setting procedures
established in Puerto Rico:
That a policy of inducements does not conflict with protection
of legitimate interests is amply illustrated by Puerto Rico.
In that island, minimum wages are fixed by law for practically
every trade, with a thoroughness unknown to the British islands,
and at a much ^jgher level... All that is required is a sense
of proportion.
Lewis proposed a Colonial Development Corporation on the model of
PRIDCO (Puerto Rico Industrial Development Corp.) with offices in London
and New York.
...The British islands do not have far to look if they want to
study the technique of industrialization. For, on their very
doorstep lies Puerto Rico, whose Industrial Development Company
is a most intelligent model of what is required...
Where is the money to come from? [PRIDCO]...has had appro
priations i^ounting to $25 million with which it has worked
wonders...
9
One is reminded of the coat of arms of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
^^Yet the very chronology of a number of industries in Puerto Rico has
not been unlike the fate of a snowball in the Caribbean: they start moving.,
and then evaporate!
Lewis was not keen on allowing just any industry. He outlined eight
criteria (wage shares, horsepower, etc.) which would guide planners, and then
ranked 42 industries by these criteria.
^^Lewis, op. cit., p. 39.
12
Ibid., p. 30* Emphasis added.
Lewis concludes:
...Some key is needed to open the door behind which the dynamic
energies of tlie West Indian people are at present confined^ The
key has obviously been found in Puerto Rico, where the drive and
enthusiasm of a people hitherto as lethargic as the British West
Indian warms the hearty and inspires confidence in the future...
put hope, initiative, direction, and an unconquerable will into
the rest of their affairs. And this is the hardest task of all.
Tills is hardly the place to review Lewis' contribution to development
theory, nor the criticisms of that theory.the 1960*s and 1970's
unfolded, however, the practice derived from that theory was shown to be
increasingly difficult. Demas,^^ by taking Lewis and other theorists to
task on the assumptions, behavior, and the "omitted" variables, plays the
game of economic models in the Caribbean. And he too sees in aspects of
Puerto Rico's growth some possibilities for the "real" development for
small nations — in the emphasis on export manufacturing ^d on the construc
tion sector.
13
Ibid., p. 53. Emphasis added.
14
Compare Lewis (1954) and Demas (1965), Chapter 4, "Bnployment
Strategies in the Commonwealth Caribbean."
^^See especially Demas (1965), (1971), and (1976). Demas remarks (1971),
p. 7, that the "two main intellectual influences underpinned the attempts to
create a new economic, social, and political order in the West Indies in the
post-1945 world were the Moyne Commission Report, 1938, and the philosophy of
industrial development evolved in the early 1950*s from the experience of
Puerto Rico." (Emphasis added.)
Demas writes much candidly on the dangers of dependence and private
foreign investment, on the limited opportunity for import substitution and
economies of scale, on external vulnerability and on the dangers of Keynesian
economies applied to an open economy. "Wliat is the real meaning of self-
sustained growth in a satellite economy?" he asks. Having raised the central
question, he answers, "I must confess, I do not know." Demas(1965), p. 32.
Citing Hoselitz' concept of "satellitic pattern of growth," (Patterns of
Economic Growth," Canadian Journal. 1955), q concept which incidentally never
did catch on in North American economics, Demas continues, "T would rnther
consider them as a crse of highly open economies with 'the capac I ty...to
adjust...to the needs and opportunities of the countries surrounding them.'"
N. 32, p. 32.
.7
While unwilling to offer any fundamental critiques of the system as a
whole, Demas in his later work takes little pain in criticizing Puerto Rico's
experience:
It is possible for a small Caribbean island to achieve a
relatively high per capita income and become "prosperous" by
literally selling-out its national patrimony to unscrupulous
foreign investment and permitting the introduction of tax havens,
casinos, free ports and numbered bank accounts...a highly artifi
cial pseudo-prosperity.. .not by any stretch of the imagination..",
"economic development"...not internally-generated self-sustaining
and soundly-based economic growth, full employment and an atti^
tude of independence and national self-reliance and self-respect.^
IWo separate traditions have been derived from the writings of Lewis
and Demas. The British'Caribbean has given rise to many concrete studies
of-integration and dependence, corporate imperialism arid the influence of
the multinationals, fragmentation and decision-making, plantations and
colonialization.^^
A second tradition has taken quite a different turn. Stimulated by
1 8Lewis (on the British Caribbean) and Reynolds (on the American Caribbean) ,
and thus derived from the experience of the smallest of nations, the "labor
surplus" model has become generalized and embellished and finally applied to
^^Demas (1976), p. 107.
^^See especially Eduardo Seda-Bonilla, "Dependence as an Obstacle to
Development: Puerto Rico.," pp. 103-108, and Lloyd Best, "Independent Thought
and Caribbean Freedom," pp. 7-28, both in Girvan and Jefferson (1971). The
literature of the British Caribbean is refreshing and extensive.
See Levitt and Best (1969) and Beckford (1972) on plantation economies;
Girvan (1971) and Jefferson (1972) on Jamaica; Tliomas (1965) and St. Pierre .
(1975) on Guyana; Armstrong et. al. (1968) on Barbados; Brown and Brewster
(1975) for summary hypotheses and some 171 references!
18
See Lewis (1954); Reynolds (1965).
19
th'e largest of all nations. Tlie consequences of the dominance of this
tradition has been that words like dependency, colonialism, and the multi
national corporation, have virtually no place in mainstream economics in the
United States.
What then Is the lesson of Puerto Rico to the U.S.-trained economist?
In one branch, those trained in "dual" or "labor surplus" economics, Puerto
Rico must be ignored, generally with some reference to the unique "political
20
arrangement." A second branch of mainstream economics, takes almost the
contrary tack: that Puerto Rico, like many other countries, is but another
"small, industry-oriented" economy, along with Jamaica and Haiti, to be
found in the company of such nations as Bolivia and Paraguay, Norway and the
21
Netherlands.
19
See Reynolds (1975) on China. He writes, "China is still a 'labor-
surplus economy' in the sense that there are many rural workers whose marginal
product is below their consumption." (p. 425). The raarginalist's vision knows
neither geographic nor historical boundaries!
The present writer's own travels to People's China and his reading of her
history leads him to conclude that the Chinese model totally contradicts the
basic propositions of the labor-surplus model.
20
Only on the most basic of challenges does the modern neo-classical
economist rely on political factors.
21
See Chenery and Taylor (1968), for example, p. 397, for charts of the
primary and industrial sectors shares "among countries and over time."
The fashion for "pooling" the experiences of large numbers of countries is
carried on in hope of being able to observe a common statistical pattern.
The present author, not exempt from such practices, had attempted to distin
guish household consumption patterns of the densely-populated island-countries
from the more sparcely-populated continental ones, and Latin American patterns
from the Asian. See Weisskoff (1971). Puerto Rico, Jamaica, and the
Dominican Republic are included in the 15 country sample.
' Whether Puerto Rico is treated as "an aberrant observation," as. in the
f first branch of mainstream economics, or as just another "series of observa-^
tions" to be homogenized with the rest of the developing world, the net
# effect is identical: the experiences of Puerto Rico, indeed of the Carib
bean as a unit, are ignored. v
?
Other disciplines do not seem quite as perplexed as "modern economics"
by the existence of the Caribbean as a viable or meaningful region.
Frank Knight, in his recent essay, writes like an econometrician with a
microscope. "Ihe major assumption," he begins, "is that while the separate
units pass through the same general experience, they do so at different times
—hence comparisons of the Caribbean should be systadial rather than syn-
chronic."^.^
23
, In his "examination of fragments," the history of the Caribbean-,
I^ight touches a great many themes that are as relevant to Puerto Rico's
i
modern history, although they are drawn from the experiences of Haiti, the
Dominican Republic, Cuba, or the British West Indies from earlier time
4 j 24
spepiods.
22
Knight (1978), p. x. Compare his essay to Birnberg and Resnick
(1975), esp. Ch. 1.
23
Ibid., p. xii.
24
The present day economist sees the chronic absenteeism of plantation
proprietors analogous to the modern transnational corporation; the willing
ness of the European powers in the 19th century to accommodate representa
tive political arrangements within, a neo-colonial economic setting as
analogous to the present commonwealths; the adeptness at imitating the mother
cpujitries' culture; the use of general funds-to subsidize the "profits of
a'few"; not to mention the constant and overwhelming importance ifi the 20th
century of the active intervention of U.S. capital and U.S. Marines. See
Knight (1968), Ch. 7, "Caribbean Nation Building, 1804-1970," esp,. pp. 159,
162, 169, 175.
.10
On contemporary Puerto Rico, however, Knight yields to his own instincts.
"The Puerto Rican 'Operation Bootstrap,*" he writes, "once highly hailed,
25
proved eventually to have more style, than substance." In ohe sense, he is
right, if the "Operation" is to be judged in terms of its original polemics.
Seen in a different perspective, however, "Bootstrap" ("self-reliance ) was
enormously successful as an economic alliance forged by Tugwell and Munoz
Marin to undercut the nationalist appeal of Albizu Campos, fend the overt
colonial status of Puerto Rico, and transform the island into a Commonwealth.
And the substance of this transformation, while-profound, differs in degree,
"but not in kind from the neighboring states of the Caribbean...with the
notable exception of Cuba."
If the Caribbean is indeed a natural and relevant unit of analysis for
the historian, the political scientist, the anthropologist, the businessman,
then why not for the economist as well? We turn, therefore, to an empirical
review of those quantitative "degrees," which distinguish and .unite the
Caribbean economies. . • •
^^Ibid., p. 211.
^^Ibid., p. 166.
.^^See Gordon K. Lewis (1968) on the British West Indies; Sid Mintz (1971)
'on "the Caribbean as a Socio-Cultural Area"; Maingot (1978) on West Indian
politics. Compare Johnard (1974) on Caribbean investment rules to Wac^tel
(1977) on transnational banks in the Cayman Islands. See also Mintz' intro-
duction to Guerra y Sanchez (1964) on the sugar islands, and compare Hagelberg
(1974) on modern Caribbean sugar to Girvan (1976) on Caribbean bauxite.
11
PART li: (JIIANTtTATLVI': DrMKNSIONS 01-' CAR1IIHICAN I-CONOMI KS
The objective in reviewing a number of dimensions of the Caribbean economy
is to attempt to discern common patterns and structures. However involved that
task, the approach here is very straightforward: to identify simply those
characteristics which set Puerto Rico and its neighbors apart from or close to
one another.
Many economists have noted that the Caribbean consists of a set of open,
28densely-populated islands. But of the world's small countries, seven of the
Caribbean economies can be counted among twenty of the world's most "open"
tading economies, and of these twenty, Puerto Rico ranks seventh in the world
and fourth in the Caribbean, behind the Netherland Antilles, Barbados, Trinidad
29and Tobago, and Guyana (see Table lA, col. 1).
In terms of simple population density—inhabitants per hectare—Puerto Rico
ranks fifth of twenty and second in the Caribbean sample after Barbados. But
in terms of "food potential"—inhabitants per hectare of arable land—Puerto Rico
ranks third highest among all the small countries and considerably above the
30
other Caribbean countries.
'^ ^See Demas (1965) and Lloyd (1968).
29Since "openness" to foreign trade, here taken as the sura of imports and
exports relative to gross domestic product, fluctuates with international events*
the present writer has calculated four-year averages to "smooth out" the cyclical
influences and thus focus on comparative structures.
30
See Table lA, cols. 4-6. Three concepts of density are presented here:
simple density (people/total land area); agricultural density (agricultural
population/arable land), index of the pressures on resources; third, a "food
potential density" (total people/arable land), a measure of possible pressure
should the country pursue a more self-sufficient food policy.
It should be remembered, however, that land, like people, is variable.
"Arable land" has been destroyed in the Caribbean through strip-mining and
quarrying, erosion;, and urban sprawl; while land has also been added due to
drainage, terracing, irrigation, and forest clearing.
Nor are the three types of densities defined here necessarily consistent
with one another. The I'eople's Republic of China (not shown in the tables) is
characterized by a simple density of .9, an agricultural density of 4.2, and a
food potential density" of 6.5 inhabitants per hectare. Puerto Rico's densities,
in,contrast, are 3.3, 1.0, and 20.0, respectively, more a reflection of both
people abandoning the lend and land being removed from arable uses.
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Compared to the full array of Caribbean countries, Puerto Rico's ?2,605
per capita income in 1973 stands nearly three times that oF Trinidad, Surinam,
and Barbados, her nearest rivals, and more than eighteen times the $141 of
Haiti (Table 2A, col. 1). Nevertheless, compared to all so-called developing
countries, the entire Caribbean, with the exception of Haiti, fall among the
T 1
highest in the developing world.
The remainder of the record testifies to the great economic fluctuations,
successes and failures throughout the Caribbean. From 1960-70, Puerto Rico's
GDP grew at 5.9% per year per person, twice the U.S. rate for that decade and
higher than most economies throughout the world. During the 1970's, Puerto
Rican growth slowed to a crawl, a fraction of the U.S. rate. The Haiti and
Dominican annual growth record is almost the reverse oE the Puerto Rican:
-.9% and 1.5% per year, respectively, during the 1960's but 7.8% and 2.6% per
year from 1970-74 (Table 2A. cols. 2-3).^^
In the 1970's, Puerto Rico's population grew at 2.6% per year, the fourth
highest in the Caribbean, although the absolute natural rate of population
increase was the second lowest (16.8 per 1,000) and the absolute decline In
Infant mortality was the second highest in the Caribbean (cols. 5-7). But
Puerto Rico is not alone In the Caribbean for its progress at having reduced
the live birth rate and infant mortality (cols. 7-8). The records of
Barbados, Belize, Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Trinidad are especially
31
See World Bank, World Tables 1976, p. 548. For available data of income
distribution in five countries, see Appendix Table IB. The Cini cooCficient
for Puerto Rico (.45) compares favorably to the U.S. and Guyana and indicates
greater equality than the Dominican Republic (.49) and Jamaica (.58). The
coniparatively small share of income (33.6Z) received by the top 10% of households
and the large share (1.6%) received by the bottom 10% in Puerto Rico speak to
division of the pie which is generally more equitable, than, say, Jamaica and
Venezuela (cols. 4-6, Table IB). See R. Weisskoff (1970) and Weisskoff and
Figueroa (1976) for a review of Latin American Income distributions.
32Is the "secret" of Puerto Rico's early growth being "passed" around the
Caribbean?
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significant when compared to the meager (and in some cases, negative) progress
33
in some of the other islands.
These economic indicators point to Puerto Rico's inclusion as a somewhat
"progressive," but ordinary member of the Caribbean. Its population density
is high, but not atypical. Its population, once held to be at the root of a
3^neo-Malthusiah dilemma, is now characterized by the lowest rate of net repro
duction (1.33 per 1,000) and of infant mortality (24.2 per 1,00,0) in the Caribbean,
the foulrth lowest live birth rate (after Barbados, Trinidad, and Cuba) and the
third lowest death rate (after Cuba and Belize). (See Table 3A, cols. 1, 5,
3, 7, -respectively.) Indeed, to the extent that population growth was ever a,
"problem," its.connection either with economic growth or with the reproduction
35 • •of a people has apparently been severred.
. One statistic points to a general problem underlying Caribbean societies:
the difficulty of putting their people to work. Except for the cases of
Haiti and Barbados, the share of the economically-active population—that, is,
those over 14 years old working or seeking work—never surpassed 31%. In
Puerto Rico, only a quarter of the relevant population, the lowest in -the area,
was economically active, but the other countries were not far ahead. (Table
• 33 •
See Appendix Table 2B for "Other Territories and the Leeward and Windward
Islands" and Appendix Table 3B for the original time series.
34, Contrast the early writings of Taylor (1952) on Puerto Rico with.Meade
(1968) on Mauritius.
'35 •• Harriet Presser (1974) estimates that by 1965, "one^third of ail Puerto
Ricap mothers from 20-49 years of age were sterilized," (p. 179) and that the
sterilization of one-sixth of the same age group of women by 1953-54 had hot '
resulted in a decline in fertility. She concludes that in the absence of a
large government or private campaign, the "popularity" of sterilization was
a^ response by Puerto Rican women who,were searching for an effective way to
limit the size of their families."
T
a
b
le
3
A
:
T
im
e
S
e
r
ie
s
o
f
S
o
c
io
-E
c
o
n
o
m
ic
C
h
a
r
a
c
te
r
is
ti
c
s
N
e
t
C
a
r
ib
b
e
a
n
R
e
p
ro
d
u
c
ti
o
n
R
at
e^
'
C
r
u
d
e
B
i
r
t
h
L
iv
e
..
R
a
te
-'
3
/
In
fa
n
t
M
o
rt
a
li
ty
^
R
a
te
s
-
R
a
te
s
p
e
r
4
/
T
h
o
u
s
a
n
d
-
C
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
1
9
7
3
1
9
5
6
1
9
7
4
•
1
9
6
5
1
9
7
3
C
r
u
d
e
B
i
r
t
h
C
r
u
d
e
D
e
a
th
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
W
(5
)
(6
)
"
(7
)
B
a
r
b
a
d
o
s
1
.4
3
3
1
.3
1
8
.9
3
9
.5
3
7
.7
1
9
.5
8
.4
B
e
l
i
z
e
—
4
6
.1
3
8
.7
4
8
.5
3
3
.7
3
8
.7
6
.1
C
u
b
a
1
.8
3
2
9
.3
2
2
.3
3
8
.4
2
8
.9
2
5
.4
5
.8
D
om
.
R
e
p
.
2
.7
8
4
0
.0
-
3
6
.4
7
2
.7
3
8
.6
4
5
.8
1
1
.0
G
u
y
a
n
a
2
.1
0
4
1
.5
3
1
.6
.
4
8
.4
3
8
.5
3
3
.4
7
.2
H
a
i
t
i
1
.7
3
—
3
5
.8
—
—
-
3
5
.8
1
6
.3
J
a
m
a
ic
a
2
.5
1
3
7
.2
3
0
.8
3
8
.8
2
6
.6
3
0
.8
7
.2
P
u
e
r
to
R
ic
o
1
.3
3
3
4
.8
2
3
.3
4
2
.8
2
4
.2
2
3
.3
6
.5
S
u
r
in
a
m
2
.9
5
3
9
.4
3
8
.0
3
3
.6
—
4
0
.9
7
.2
T
r
in
id
a
d
1
.5
7
3
7
.0
2
1
.6
3
8
.1
2
6
.2
2
4
.0
•
6
.5
U
S
A
.8
8
2
4
.9
1
4
.7
2
4
.7
1
6
.5
1
4
.7
8
.9
S
o
u
rc
e
s:
C
o
l.
1
;
U
N
,
D
em
o
g
ra
p
h
ic
Y
ea
rb
o
o
k
,
1
9
7
6
,
T
a
b
le
2
2
.
C
o
l.
2
-
3
:
U
N
.o
o
.
c
i
t
.
.
1
9
7
6
.
T
a
b
le
2
1
.
d
d
.
4
9
2
f
f
-p
H
a
it
i,
1
9
7
0
-
C
o
l.
4
-
5
:
U
N
,
o
p
.
c
i
t
.
C
o
l.
6
-
7
:
U
N
,
o
p
.
c
i
t
.
C
o
l.
2
:
C
u
b
a
,
1
9
5
7
,'
C
o
l.
3
:
G
u
y
a
n
a
,
1
9
7
1
;
N
o
te
s
:
1
9
7
5
,
T
a
b
le
1
5
.
D
a
ta
fo
r
B
e
li
z
e
re
fe
rs
to
1
9
5
7
,
G
u
y
an
a
to
1
9
6
8
.
•1
9
7
5
,-
T
a
b
le
4
,
p
p
.
1
5
4
ff
.
1)
N
um
be
r
o
f
d
au
g
h
te
rs
b
o
rn
a
li
v
e
p
er
1
,0
0
0
fe
m
al
es
15
--
49
y
ea
rs
o
ld
ta
k
in
g
d
ea
th
in
to
ac
co
u
n
t
2)
N
um
be
r
o
f
li
v
e
b
ir
th
p
e
r
th
o
u
sa
n
d
o
f
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
.
3)
D
ea
th
s
o
f
in
fa
n
ts
u
n
d
er
on
e
y
ea
r
p
er
1
,0
0
0
li
v
e
b
ir
th
s.
4
)
F
o
r
v
a
ri
o
u
s
re
c
e
n
t
y
e
a
rs
.
O
N
•17
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The general economic structures of the Caribbean economies show differences
in degree, Surinam and Guyana lead In the size of* government expenditures
relative to GDP, while Puerto Rico and Jamaica surpass the other economies
in .the share of gross fixed capital formation (Table 4, cols. 2 and 3). On
the orientation toward foreign trade, however, the Caribbean breaks into two
groups: Ciiba, the Dominican Republic and Haiti, on the one hand,' which show
a limited (less than 20%) share of exports to GDP and the other islands and
Guyana, whose export share exceeds 35% of GDP.
How have these characteristics changed in the Caribbean since the early-
1960 s? The time series (Table 5) chronology of these variables indicates that
the government sector in Puerto Rico has groim from 13,to 18% of GDP, and is '
parallel to a similar expansion in Guyana and Jamaica (cols. 2-3).^^ The growth
in the.share of capital formation in Puerto Rico from 21 to 25% of GDP is
comparable to increases in-Jamaica and the Dominican Republic and contrast to
the d_ecline in Trinidad and to the stability in Guyana, Haiti and the U.S.
(cols. 4-5).
The stability in the shares of both exports;and imports in Puerto Rico
(cols, 6-7) between 196-62 and 1970-72 is striking when compared to the' vagaries
of .trade experienced in the rest of the Caribbean. In the Dominican Republic
and Jamaica, -the share of exports fell and Imports rose, while both shares rose
in Guyana and fell in Haiti and Trinidad. In contrast to the stability of
"trade" in Puerto Rico, net "openness" increased in four and declined in two
3'6 . • • .How ironic that both Haiti, the poorest country in the Caribbean, with
an income of $141 per capita,and the U.S., the richest nation with an income of
$b,189 per person, should put the highest shares of their adults to work.'
37„The concepts used in the Cuban accounts are not comparable.
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Caribbean economies (cols. 10-11).
Seen in terms of economic activities, Puerto Rico differs In degree In •
several respects (Table 6). Of all the Caribbean economies, Puerto Rico
demonstrated the smallest agriculture and mining sectors, the largest manufacturing
and the largest "other services" (including government). But Jamaica and
Trinidad also reveal reduced agrarian sectors, in strong contrast to Haiti
and the Dominican Republic which, like Puerto Rico, demonstrate only minor
mining activity. Puerto Rico leads the Caribbean in its share of manufacturing
(26%), but the Dominican Republic (13%) and Trinidad (16%) have significant
enclaves as well, especially in contrast to Haiti, Guyana, and Jamaica "
(10-12% each).
During the decade, the most noticeable and widespread change is to be seen
in the.general declining share of agriculture, seen most dramatically in the-
case of Guyana and Puerto Rico, but also a trend in Jamaica and Trinidad
(Table 7, cols. 1-2). Striking, however, is that only in Puerto Rico—and to*a
lesser degree in Guyana and Jamaica—has public administration picked up so
much of the slack, while that same role has been played by mining in Guyana
and Jamaica, manufacturing in Trinidad, and construction in the Dominican
Republic.
The uniqueness of; the Puerto Rican case lies not in. its change from
agriculture to manufacturing, nor in the rise of services and government, (for
other countries are pursuing that same route), but rather Puerto Rico's
uniqueness lies in the absolute size of those sectors—agriculture being the
smallest, and manufacturing and services, the largest in the Caribbean. It
is with some irony that Puerto Rico, in terms of proportions, has taken on
the profile of the economic structure of the United States (Table 6 and 7,
bottom line).
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Demns has ar'gued that a nation's real dependence grov;s out of its reliance
on'a few trading partners and on the success of a few commodities. In these
terras, Puerto Rico leads the Caribbean in terms of the highest dependence on
the U.S. for both exports and imports^but the rest of the Caribbean is not far
behind: in all cases, four partners account for from 64 to 79% of every country's
' -39
imports and,from 58 to 92%'of its exports (see Table 8, col. 1).
In terms of commodity concentration, Barbados, Belize, and Jamaica share
Puerto Rico's general diversification of imports, but none compares to the export
diversification, a reflection of the importance of her manufacturing sector.
Thus, only in the case of Puerto Rico does low export concentration by commodity
contrast with high import and export concentration by country.- In the rest of
the Caribbean, export-commodity concentration is coupled with country concentration.
But neither trade concentration nor the degree of "openness" by itself need
say anything about "dependence." Indeed, the arrangements under which, .trade is
carried-out, the general exchange of goods, the degree of stability or instability
that such trade brings, and the implied or overt constraints which lie" behind
such, arrangements—all these must be examined before any judgement about
"dependency" can be made.
There is one judgement that we should be allowed to venture in the case of.
Puerto Rico, vis-^-vis, the rest of the Caribbean (see Table 9, col. 3):^^
• ^8
Demas (1965), n. 32, p. 32.
39 . . .The four-country concentration ratio is the share of a country's trade
with' its top four customers. The four-commodity concentration ratio is the,
share of trade accounted for by the four major commodities.
40 ^ .
Maintaining the "success story" of Puerto Rico has amounted to a subsidy of
some $5.75 million per day for the 1975-77 calculated in current collars. The
conclusion drawn from the history of the British West Indies in the i9th Century
proves as true for the American West Indies in the 20th:
, The use of general funds to subsidize the labor costs of priyate
estates meant that everyone directly contributed to the profits of a
few.... (Knight, 1973, p. 175). ' ,
The-general costs of maintaining U.S. hegemony elsewhere, in the Caribbean
are, as well as in. Puerto Rico^ borne through military expenditures. These are
not included in the above figures.
>
'•
'
T
a
b
le
8
:-
In
d
ic
a
to
rs
o
f
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
c
e
:-
.T
ra
d
e
C
o
n
c
e
n
tr
a
ti
o
n
b
y
C
o
u
n
tr
y
an
d
b
y
C
o
m
m
o
d
it
y
,
1
9
6
3
.
C
a
r
ib
b
e
a
n
C
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
4
-C
o
u
n
tr
y
C
o
n
c
e
n
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
R
a
t
i
o
s
%
%
Im
p
o
rt
s
E
x
p
o
r
ts
(1
)
(2
)
4
-C
o
m
in
o
d
it
y
C
o
n
c
e
n
tr
a
ti
o
n
R
a
ti
o
s
'
%
%
Im
p
o
rt
s
.
E
x
p
o
rt
s
(3
)
(4
)
<
V /o
o
p
e
n
n
e
s
s
(X
+
M
/G
D
P
)
(5
)
M
a
jo
r
E
x
p
o
r
ts
•
(6
)
B
a
r
b
a
d
o
s
6
4
8
4
2
3
9
5
1
2
0
su
g
a
r,
ri
im
,
m
a
rg
./
la
rd
,
s
h
e
l
l
f
i
s
h
B
e
l
i
z
e
7
9
8
7
1
9
8
7
9
1
s
u
g
a
r,
f
r
u
it
p
r
e
s
.,
w
o
o
d
,
c
h
ic
le
C
u
b
a
7
4
5
8
3
2
9
7
3
8
s
u
g
a
r,
n
ic
k
e
l,
to
b
a
c
c
o
,
c
ig
a
re
tt
e
/c
ig
a
r
D
o
m
.
R
e
p
.
7
1
8
7
2
9
8
2
4
2
s
u
g
a
r,
c
o
ff
e
e
,
c
o
c
o
a
,
b
a
u
x
./
a
lu
m
in
a
G
u
y
a
n
a
7
5
8
0
.
2
8
9
9
.
1
1
0
s
u
g
a
r,
b
a
u
x
it
e
,
r
ic
e
,
f
is
h
H
a
i
t
i
7
2
6
9
—
8
3
3
4
c
o
f
f
e
e
,
b
a
u
x
it
e
,
h
a
n
d
ic
ra
ft
s
,
s
is
a
l
J
a
m
a
ic
a
7
1
9
2
2
3
8
2
7
2
b
a
u
x
it
e
,
s
u
g
a
r,
b
a
n
a
n
a
,
f
r
u
it
p
re
s
.
P
u
e
r
t
o
R
ic
o
9
2
9
8
2
1
5
0
1
1
0
c
lo
th
in
g
,
s
u
g
a
r,
p
e
tr
o
l
p
ro
d
.,
c
ig
a
r
T
ri
n
id
a
d
&
T
o
b
ag
o
7
4
6
5
5
6
9
3
1
2
4
p
e
tr
o
l,
p
ro
d
.,
s
u
g
a
r,
c
ru
d
e
p
e
tr
o
l,
c
o
c
o
a
S
o
u
rc
e
:
U
n
it
e
d
N
a
ti
o
n
s
,
Y
e
a
rb
o
o
k
o
f
I
n
te
r
n
a
ti
o
n
a
l
T
ra
d
e
S
ta
ti
s
ti
c
s
,
1
9
6
6
,
V
o
l.
I,
'
I
I
,
T
a
b
le
2
-4
.
C
o
m
m
o
d
it
y
ra
ti
o
s
-'
w
e
re
c
a
lc
u
la
te
d
b
y
su
m
m
in
g
th
e
fo
u
r
m
o
st
im
p
o
rt
a
n
t
3
-d
ig
it
S
IT
C
c
o
m
m
o
d
it
ie
s.
H
a
it
ia
n
d
a
ta
fr
o
m
In
s
ti
tu
t
H
a
it
ie
r-
d
e
S
ta
ti
s
ti
q
u
e
,
G
u
id
e
E
co
n
o
m
ig
u
e
d
e
la
R
e
p
^
b
li
q
u
e
D
'H
a
lt
i,
•
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r,
1
9
7
1
,
T
a
b
le
1
3
-1
-1
,
1
3
-2
-1
,
a
n
d
1
3
-2
-2
.
P
u
e
rt
o
R
ic
a
n
d
a
ta
fr
o
m
P
u
e
rt
o
R
ic
o
P
la
n
n
in
g
B
o
a
rd
,
E
x
te
rn
a
l
T
ra
d
e
S
ta
ti
s
ti
c
s
1
9
6
3
,
c
a
lc
u
la
te
d
a
n
d
r
e
c
la
s
s
if
ie
d
fr
o
m
T
a
b
le
1
,
3
,
4
,
a
n
d
6
.
25
That is has been no bargain for the U.S. taxpayer. Total foreign assistance
to Puerto Rico, which here includes outright grants-in~aid and net transfers,
far exceeds ^'formal** aid, anywhere else in the Caribbean.
26
, Table 9: Assistance to the Caribbean: Total and Per Capita, 1972-74
•
1973
GDP/cap
US $
Total-''
Foreign
Assistance
US $
a/
Foreign-
Assistance
Per Capita
US ^
w Dominican Republic 529
(tiious. )
20 5
Guyana 398 11 14
Haiti 141 9 2
Jamaica. 950 18 9
Puerto Rico 2,650 980 338
Puerto Rico 2,098-^ 723-^
Trinidad & Tobago 1,295 2 2 :
Fr. Guiana — 36 719
Guadeloupe 1,218 90 265
Martinique 1,444 103 303
*
Neth. Antilles 2,070 29 124
a/
— Annual average, 1972-74.
—^Refers to 1975-77 period.
Source
c/
Refers to gross product per capita for
1975-77 in current dollars.
Cbl, 1: UN, Yearbook of National Account Statistics, 1975, Table 3.
Data for Puerto Rico, 1975-77, from Governor's Report, 1978,
Table 1.
Cols. 2-3: UN, Statistical Yearbook, 1975, Table 206, p. 830. Refers
to total of bilateral and multilateral aid.
Puerto Rico: from Governor's Report, 1978, Table 21, p. A-22,
net balance of transfer payments from federal and state
governments, plus Table 27, p. A-28, federal grants^in-aid
to Commonwealth Government recurrent receipts.
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PART C: Tl{E PUERTO RICAN ECONOMY
The profile of the Puerto Rican "miracle" during the past 27 years sheds
further light on its shortcomings as well as its gains (see Table 10). Despite
the trebling of real GDP per capita, the share of adults not working—for
whatever reason—has risen from one-half to two-thirds of the adult population
during the period of "economic growth" (line 6).
For those who did work, changes in the structure of employment reveal the
demise of agriculture, a slight rise in manufacturing, the bloating of services,
and the trebling of government employment.
Seen in retrospect, Caribbean models of developraent never intended to
A2increase employment, but rather to raise the incomes of those who are employed.
The Puerto Rican construction sector, once thought to be the alternative
absorber of labor, doubled from 1950 to 1970-'-and collapsed by 1977. It
remained, then, for services, not manufacturing, to pick up the "surplus"
labor and for government to serve as the employer of last (or perhaps first)
resort (Table 10, line 7d and 7e).
"41
Further declines are expected. The USDA-PRDOA Task Force Report (1978)
nails the coffin shut on agriculture.
A2
Demas (1976) summarized the experience aptly:
Most plans in underdeveloped countries are in fact aimed at
increasing per capita income—even though lip service may be
paid to other objectives, such as a more equal income distribu
tion, employment creation, and greater national control of the
economy...The fact is that employment is regarded as a by-product
of general economic growth... Economic growth and employment
creation are really two separate things... (p. 42).
Demas cites Puerto Rico as evidence that:
...high investment does not necessarily lead to high employment;
high wages paid to foreign-o^-med, capital intensive industries
raise the supply price of labor and restrict absorption...(with
the) exaggerated impact of the value of the "consumer society"
depressing the savings rate, (P. 86.)
This observation is often turned on its head, and the high wage rates to
the few are then blamed for the limited spread of manufacturing I
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All during this period of "attracting" private funds to build industry,
the Commonwealth was also borrowing internationally to fuel its agencies and .
43
state corporations. ' From 1970 to 1977, this "public" debt rose from 35 to
80% of gross product (Table 10, line 8). With the economic base of the island
eroding in the early seventies, Puerto Rico experienced its own version of •
a !*balancG--of-payments" crisis: the temporary revoking of the Island's
"blue chip" credit rating, and the dispatching of a blue-ribbon commission to
44
study her finances.
Puerto Rico's "strategy of development," indeed,.of much of the Caribbean,
may be summarized as a process characterized by "capital in, labor out," a
reference to the enormous inflows of U.S. money of the past thirty years and to •
the migrations which have changed both Puerto Rico and the urban scene in the
Eastern United States. But the situation is more complicated than that.
- The real motivation for "settling" the Caribbean, today as in earlier
eras,, has lain in its ability to turn labor into profit, through the production,
export, and sale of a product—sugar, coffee, tobacco—in the world market.
The area's voracious appetite for both capital and labor, and hence its .immense
wealth, came not from the mining or looting of the mercantilists*' bullion but
• 43
The system of public credit, i.e., of national debts, whose
^^rigin we discover in Genoa and Venice as early as the middle
ages,, took possession of Europe generally during the manufacturing
- periods..national debts, i.e., the alientation of the state...marked
with its stamp the capitalistic era. The only part of the so-called
• national wealth that actually enters into the collection possessions
of modern people is—their national debt...And with the rise of
national debt-making, want of faith in the national debt takes the
place of blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, which may not be forgiven,
Marx (1867), p. 654.
44
Perhaps a less powerful analogue to recent IMF Missions to Jamaica
and-Guyana.
30
through the sheer labor of slaves, coolies, free-holders, colonos, and
-45
rural proletariat. That today's "staple" may be manufactured goods, and
tomorrow's may be copper or petroleum in the Puerto Rican case, makes a
difference only in that labor is no longer needed in such great quantities.
Now it is the United States and Western Europe which are in need of low-wage
labor.
The final tally is simply that during the past 27 years, $12 billion have
been invested and $6 billion of profits earned, calculated in constant 195A
prices (Table 11, lines 1 and 2, col. 1).^^
But another real question is not only the total earned, but the net put into
. the island arid the net taken out. The net capital inflow into Puerto Rico plus
public transfers, all calculated in constant 1954 prices, has accumulated to
.some $14.1 billion over the 27 years, while profits remitted from Puerto Rico
have amounted to some $7.4 billion (Table 11, lines 3-5).
If, as Demas has indicated above, employment is but a by-product of economic
growth, then unemployment and its consequence, migration, too must be regarded
as its by-products. The present writer estimates conservatively that, the number
of Puerto Rican migrants to the United States has amounted to 636,000 people
during the perio'd 1950-77, 19% of the 1977 population or nearly 30% of the 1950.
population (see Table 11, line 6).
45, We are reminded of the Demerara's planter's remark to Anthony Trollope,
"Give me my heart's desire for coolies, and we will supply the world with
sugar." Quoted in Beachley (1957), p. 99.
46^ .For a study which attempts to "trace" the causes of employment and
unemployment in Puerto Rico, see Weisskoff (1976).
Not quite a sugar island of former centuries, but not bad by modern
business standards.
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To summarize, then, the inflows o£ capital from private U.S. and International
business plus subsidies from the U.S taxpayer have been instrumental in generating
two products; one expressed in value terras—profits—and one in human terms—
people--and.with this, the Puerto Rican daisppra.
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PARTsD: CONCLUDING REMARKS
' I have argued that Puerto Rico and the Caribbean economies fall within
a class of the world's smallest, most open, most densely-populated countries.
Within the Caribbean itself, distinctions can be made on the basis of density,
trade openness, income level., equality, rates of growth, and population
characteristics. In Barbados, Trinidad, Jamaica, and Guyana trade is "open" and
incomes are high and equally distributed, in contrast, for example, to the
Dominican Republic and Haiti. The Caribbean countries are also characterized
by either a large agricultural sector, as in Haiti and the Dominican Republic,
or a large'mining sector, as in Jamaica or Trinidad, or both, as in Guyana.
Only Puerto Rico has neither, having built and sustained a large manufacturing
enclave.^® But all the countries of the Caribbean share a common trait: the
dependence of "external trade"^^ with relatively few "partners" and, with the
lone exception of Puerto Rico, a high dependence on a relatively few exported
products.-
In all the Caribbean, the employment generated directly by the dynamic
export sectors has hardly proved sufficient to put her people-to work, and this
is .evident in the low participation rates observed throughout the Caribbean.
The .remaining labor-surplus and value-surplus is thus-divided between the service
sector and the state (public administration). The most extreme case of this
"development" is Puerto Rico, in which the state and services are supported by
public grants and transfers from the United States which have run on-the
^^See Weisskoff and Wolff (1977), esp. the methodology and conclusions.
49.
We are reminded of John Stuart Mill's description of the West Indies as
"the place where England finds it convenient to carry of the production of sugar,
coffee, and a few other tropical commodities". To that list we must add bauxite,
petroleum, and manufacturing. "The trade of the Wqst Indies is hardly to be .
considered as external trade, but more resembles the traffic between town and
country." Quoted from J. S. Mill, Principles., 1892, p. 454-5, in Demas (1965),
p. 31.
3A
order of $6 million per dny during the 1975-77 period.
In the developing world today, two types of "strategies" are held out In
the escape from economic backwardness. "Export promotion" is fashioned for
the small economies with limited land or poor resources, like the Caribbean,
in hope of following the Dutch, Danish, or Belgian examples. "Import substitu
tion", the classic Latin American path» is held out for the larger country with
a wider national market and considerable hinterland.But by the end of the
1970's, countries which had pursued the import substitution path now speak of
export promotion, for example, Brazil with her "non-traditional exports" and
Mexico with her success of branch plant manufacturing. In these countries,
apparently an accommodation has been reached between the national
bourgeoisie and labor, on the one hand,and the multi-national corporation,
on the other.
Those countries which have pursued export promotion in the past now speak
of the hopes of import substitution. They entertain thoughts of standardized
products to consolidate a potentlally-"national" market. They speak of promoting
local entrepreneurs, revitalizing agriculture and becoming "self-reliant" in
local food production.They speak of production for use, not export, and on
basing local taxes on "negative", not positive, value-added in order to promote
local processing. But many new obstacles are encountered in departures from
the customary path.
Irrespective of the particular path, however, the labor-surplus model has
A small economy—the argument goes—cannot support a wide-enough home
market; it has no capital goods industry; its propensity to save is too low
and propensity to import too high.
^^"It is highly significant", footnotes Demas, "that during the Second
World War, when links with the metropolis were severly reduced, domestic
agriculture flourished." Demas (1971), n. 1, p. 8.
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been univorsnlly npplLod. FormuLnted In terms of the marjjinnl. product'oF
workers in the traditional sector, the mod^l has held out hope that the human
potential released from agriculture and from households, or born fresh, would
eventually be absorbed in the "modern" or highly-productive sector. Puerto
Rico, I have argued, has traveled the farthest on this path with the demise of
agriculture, the growth of manufacturing, and the absorption by the service and
state sectors. In the meantime, all the Caribbean countries share the difficulty
of putting their adult population to work in any manner^ without even raising
the question of the productivity or meaningfulness of that manner.
The failure of the. labor-surplus economy lies not in its economic performance,
for both-paths—import substitution and export promotion—'have functioned well.
Rather, its failure lies in the explanation given by the model, the paradigm
under which profits have been made inland resources extracted from^these economies.
The greatest irony of all is that the modern paradigm is couched in terms
of labor and labor-surplus, while real events are best understood in terms of.
value and value-surplus, That which Trinidad, the Dominican Republic, and ,
Puerto Rico have in common with each other—and with Brazil,. Chile, and Peru—
is not only labor (and surplus-labor, at that), but value and surplus-yalue.
And it is to such models that further study must turn if the basic issues of
Caribbean development are to be understood.
Which is the appropriate—or likely—path of future economic development
for the Caribbean? Is it the path of Puerto Rico or Cuba? I have argued here
simply that Puerto Rico has traversed certain terrain with fewer reservations
than most other countries. I would also argue now, in the light of the recent
52discoveries of copper-bearing ores and off-shore oil , that it may be the rest
of the Caribbean which can serve as well as a model for Puerto Rico.
"52
See Tanzer (1978) on possible oil agreements
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